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In 1908, the Ottoman Third Army marched from Macedonia to Istanbul and forced the sultan to restore the constitution, introduced in 1876 and 
suspended in 1878 under the duress of war 
with Russia. In 1909, chanting crowds of 
religious students (softas) and turbaned 
clerics, along with disaffected soldiers, 
swarmed through the streets of Istanbul, 
demanding an end to constitutional gov-
ernment and the introduction of sharia 
law. Revolution had been followed by a 
counterrevolution, but the army struck 
back and sent the sultan into exile. Dervis 
Vahdeti, head of the Muhammadan Soci-
ety and publisher of the newspaper Volkan 
(Volcano), was hanged — along with many 
others — for his central role in instigating 
the uprising. In 1923, the revolution was 
consolidated with the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic. It took shape according 
to the vision of its founder, Mustafa Kemal 
“Ataturk,” and thus was modernizing and 
secular, confining religion to the mosque 
and the home, and emancipating women. 
The state was also one-party and authori-
tarian, driving political Islam and Kurdish 
identity underground, only for them to rise 
to the surface again decades later. 
 “Democracy” came to Turkey in 1946, 
but the military remained the guardian 
of the state and what it regarded as “Ke-
malist values.” It struck down civilian 
governments in 1960 and 1980 and drove 
the Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party out of 
office in 1997. Political Islam resurfaced in 
the form of the Justice and Development 
(Adalet ve Kalkinma) Party (the AKP), 
elected to office in 2002 with 34 percent 
of the vote. The AKP government brought 
down inflation and stabilized the currency, 
economic and fiscal achievements which, 
even if they were the legacy of the previous 
government’s policies, helped to account 
for the 46.6 percent of the vote the AKP 
received in the 2007 general elections. In 
March 2008, the public prosecutor asked 
the Constitutional Court to close the party 
down after the government lifted the ban 
on wearing the hijab (head scarf) at state 
universities. In July, 10 of the 11 judges on 
the court ruled that the party was a “centre 
of anti-secular activities,” but only six — 
one short of the number needed — voted 
to close it down.1 In June 2011, the AKP 
won 49.83 percent of the vote in general 
elections, establishing Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, one of the party’s 
founders and a former member of Refah, as 
the most successful politician in Turkey’s 
history and setting the government up for 
another electoral victory in 2015. 
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of an independent inquiry into prima facie 
evidence of large-scale corruption reaching 
into the government and circles close to it. 
The changes that have transformed Turkey 
since 2002 amount to an incremental coun-
terrevolution largely based on Erdogan’s 
understanding of Islam, seeping slowly 
into every crevice of state and society and 
reshaping the structure of both. 
THE “NEW” TURKEY
 Erdogan is aggressive and authoritar-
ian; increasingly, he is the state. When he 
speaks, others follow without question. 
“Enemies” are being flushed out of the 
system; the judiciary has been brought 
under tight government control; intel-
ligence and police powers have been 
extended; and the media is being harassed. 
Yet, for his loyal supporters, the leader 
can do no wrong, no matter how serious 
the evidence of malfeasance within the 
government and disruption of the consti-
tutional system. Having held the office of 
prime minister since 2002, Erdogan was 
voted into the presidency by more than 52 
percent of voters on August 10, 2014. In 
late October, he moved into a grandiose 
new presidential palace, built inside the 
Ataturk Orman Ciftligi (Forest Farm), the 
first president’s personal property, donated 
to the nation shortly before his death in 
1938. Watching the assault on Gezi Park 
last year, the world did not notice the 
masses of trees being cut down in Ankara 
to make way for the residence of a man 
whose values and vision are the antith-
esis of Ataturk’s. When an administrative 
tribunal ordered a halt to construction 
after finding that no proper environmental, 
historical, cultural or aesthetic concerns 
had been addressed prior to the removal 
of the first-degree protected status of the 
site, Erdogan insisted that the construction 
 In the fallout from the suppression 
of the Refah Party, Erdogan, mayor of 
Istanbul at the time, was jailed for recit-
ing a poem regarded as subversive of the 
secular order (even though it was written 
by a founding figure of modern Turkish 
nationalism, Ziya Gokalp). Learning from 
his own mistakes and those of his Islamist 
mentors, he moved cautiously once in 
government. His most dangerous enemy 
was the military. At a time when “civil-
ianization” of the military was an issue 
supported domestically and by the EU, 
his government initiated the prosecutions 
of hundreds of senior officers, retired and 
serving, alleging that they were involved in 
a conspiracy to overthrow his government. 
In a country where the military had seemed 
practically above human intervention, the 
neutralization of the military through these 
trials was probably Erdogan’s most aston-
ishing achievement. 
 It was said at the beginning that he 
had a “secret agenda,” and in the 12 years 
since his party was first elected into gov-
ernment, his plans have slowly unfolded 
above ground. He once said, “Thank God 
almighty I am a servant of sharia,”2 and 
early in the life of his government, he 
wanted to introduce a specifically Islamic 
law (zina) criminalizing adultery. He 
stepped back only in the face of domes-
tic and EU opposition.3 Deep structural 
changes in recent years include educational 
“reforms” and limitations on a woman’s 
right to choose — not just whether to have 
a child but how it should be born. The gov-
ernment has employed the machinery of 
the state to crush dissent on the streets and 
has intervened in the media — including 
the Internet and social media — to silence 
its critics. Purges of police and prosecu-
tors and the tightening of control over the 
judiciary have eliminated any possibility 
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the government to shelve it. Erdogan in-
sists that the reconstruction of the barracks 
(to be turned into a shopping mall around 
what would have been the parade ground) 
will still go ahead. 
 On the Asian side of the Bosporus, 
another landmark project, a mosque, is be-
ing built on top of a hill at Camlica, at 288 








will be tall 
enough and 
large enough 
to compel attention from across the city.5 
Erdogan has referred to it as a “selatin” 
(plural of sultan) mosque, such a those the 
sultans built from their private wealth. This 
is not the case with the Camlica mosque; 
the state is paying. Mosques are being 
built across the country, sometimes so 
close together that there cannot possibly 
be a congregation for them. It is what they 
represent that seems to be the point, not the 
numbers inside. 
 There is symbolism also in Erdogan’s 
choice of a site for the new presidential 
palace. “Historical score-settling” found 
an opening in the clearing of 22.5 acres 
in the first president’s forest farm to make 
way for a grandiose 1,150-room presiden-
tial palace, Ak Saray (the White Palace), 
a play on the acronym for the ruling AK 
Party.6 Covering an area of 300,000 square 
meters, Ak Saray is larger than the palace 
of the sultan of Brunei.7 Erdogan refers 
to the forest farm area, known until now 
as Ataturk Orman Ciftligi, as Bestepe. In 
Istanbul, his official residence is the man-
was not illegal, adding, “If they have the 
power, let them destroy it.”4
 Ataturk’s Turkey is being disappeared, 
and as much as Erdogan’s supporters adore 
him, he is loathed by Turks who remain 
loyal to the founder’s vision. Last year, an 
elderly man walking around the streets of 
Ankara captured their feelings: stopping 
every now and then, he quickly drew a 
side profile 
of Ataturk 
on a bank 







over to kiss his hands. The country is 
polarized as never before, with Erdogan 
frequently sharpening the divisions — 
between “white” (urban middle class) 
and “black” (urban and provincial poor), 
between Turks and their foreign enemies, 
and between Turks and enemies inside 
their house, especially the “parallel state” 
(supporters of the Muslim cleric Fethullah 
Gulen, allegedly inside the government 
and the bureaucracy). 
 The symbols of Erdogan’s “new 
Turkey” are everywhere on the landscape. 
The Gezi Park protests last year were not 
just about the cutting down of trees but the 
planned clearing of Taksim Square, symbol 
of republican Turkey in the 1930s. The 
plan was to make way for a mosque and a 
shopping mall inside the reconstruction of 
a rococo late nineteenth-century Ottoman 
military barracks that had stood on the site 
until pulled down in 1940. The project 
would have involved the demolition of the 
Ataturk Centre, Istanbul’s landmark con-
cert hall, had not the Gezi protests forced 
Mosques are being built across the 
country, sometimes so close together that 
there cannot possibly be a congregation 
for them. It is what they represent that 
seems to be the point, not the numbers 
inside. 
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schools. In some cases, primary-school 
students have been channeled into these 
schools, for zoning reasons, whether they 
and their parents like it or not.10 
 While imam-hatip schools are reli-
gion-based, religion and ethics classes are 
compulsory in all schools. Christian and 
Jewish students are exempt, but Alevis are 
not and have complained in an action filed 
with the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) that their children were being sub-
jected to a Sunni understanding of Islam 
that treated “the Alevi faith as a tradition 
or culture and not as a belief system in 
its own right.”11 The court ruled that, in 
forcing students to attend religion and eth-
ics classes, the Turkish government was 
violating their rights. Critics say that these 
classes are a form of Sunni indoctrination. 
Erdogan’s occasional slighting references 
to Alevis and the refusal of the parliament 
to allow space for a cem evi (Alevi house 
of prayer) within its grounds have rein-
forced Alevi dislike of his government and 
suspicion of its motives. 
 A further avenue of religious influence 
on education is the Diyanet (Director-
ate of Religious Affairs), which receives 
more government funding than the total 
sum allocated to nine ministries.12 The 
Diyanet has just inaugurated Turkey’s first 
“religious complex” in the western city 
of Bursa. This compound will include the 
Diyanet Academy, with an imam-hatip 
high school, a mosque, student dormitories 
and a kindergarten. The Diyanet is also 
planning to open an “international Islamic 
university” as an alternative to Al-Azhar in 
Cairo and Islamic universities elsewhere; 
the site would be the current May 29 Uni-
versity on the Asian side of the Bosporus. 
Through the Religious Affairs Foundation, 
the Diyanet sponsors scholarships for thou-
sands of students from Muslim countries. 
sion of the last Ottoman sultan, Vahdettin, 
its distinctive onion dome pulled down and 
reconstructed in concrete to meet the new 
president’s needs. 
 The substance behind the symbolism 
is apparent in the reconstruction of the 
education system, the streaming of stu-
dents into imam-hatip (prayer leader and 
preacher) religious schools, and the decree 
allowing middle and high school girls to 
wear the hijab in class.8 Creationism is 
reemphasized in textbooks,9 and religious 
instruction focuses overwhelmingly on 
Sunni Islam, in a country with a large 
Shia-based Alevi population. In 2012, the 
school system was completely overhauled. 
As originally introduced, the “4+4+4” 
system — four years of first-level primary, 
four years of secondary-level primary and 
four years of high school — would have 
allowed parents to take children out of the 
school system at the age of 12 to give them 
distance education or home schooling. For 
girls, this was likely to lead to unpaid do-
mestic labor and early marriage, especially 
in regions where polygamy through an 
informal mosque ceremony is quite com-
mon. Popular protest forced the govern-
ment to drop this aspect of the legislation, 
but the law still allows children to be trans-
ferred to vocational high schools to learn 
such skills as car care and hairdressing. 
Only time will tell of the effect this has 
had on their lives, especially on the lives of 
young girls whose conservative religious 
parents do not place the same emphasis on 
education for girls as for boys. Channeling 
young people into a religious education 
has been furthered by allowing imam-hatip 
schools to take in students from the age of 
10, instead of 15, as before. Furthermore, 
the number of these schools has been rap-
idly increased through the transformation 
of regular high schools into imam-hatip 
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the belief that they were PKK militants, 
he remarked that “every abortion is a 
Uludere.” 
 He also regards abortion and even 
caesarean births — because of the belief 
that they reduce a woman’s ability to have 
more children — as a “secret plot” against 
Turkey’s population and economic growth15 
and has referred to contraception as 
“treason,” accusing his political opponents 
of “betraying” the country by promoting 
birth control and trying to “dry up” coming 
generations. In July 2012, the government 
passed legislation allowing caesarean births 
only in the case of medical emergency and 
fining doctors who persuade women to 
have them “unnecessarily.”16 Who decides 
what is necessary is not made clear. Turkey 
has one of the highest caesarean birth rates 
in the world, and the debate includes claims 
of profit-seeking by private hospitals, the 
reality of natural difficulties in labor and 
the fact that women are having children at 
a later age, when “natural” birth can be dif-
ficult. For many women, the central point is 
that the government is taking choice out of 
their hands. 
 Abortion is still legal up to 10 weeks, 
but it is subject to such conditions as to be 
virtually unobtainable in state hospitals. 
There have been reports of women being 
given abortions without anaesthesia and of 
the Ministry of Health requiring laborato-
ries to provide details of pregnancy tests, 
including the names and mobile phone 
numbers of women who test positive.17 
Dr. Cansun Demir, the head of the Turkish 
Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecolo-
gists, believes the government decided 
“behind closed doors” not to fund abor-
tions. Without funds, the hospitals cannot 
provide them. “What is left to doctors is 
either classifying any abortion as a medical 
necessity or redirecting the woman to seek 
It appoints mosque functionaries, decides 
the contents of the Friday sermons, is a 
major publisher of religious books and has 
a pervasive influence across the culture.          
                
DECIDING FOR WOMEN
 Education, indoctrination, social pres-
sure and fertility are the means by which 
Erdogan’s “pious generations” will be 
created. On one day he says every woman 
should have three children, and on another 
that they should have five, exhorting wom-
en to play their part in the creation of the 
“new Turkey,” irrespective of acute eco-
nomic pressures. Erdogan once remarked, 
“I don’t believe in equality between men 
and women,”13 a position backed by the 
actions of his government and statements 
of ministers, advisers and bureaucrats. He 
has since clarified his position by stating 
that women are not equal to men but rather 
“equivalent” to them. His prime minister, 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, has linked high suicide 
rates in developed countries (specifying 
Scandinavia) to “mechanical equality” in 
gender relations. 
 The Law for the Protection of the 
Family and Prevention of Violence against 
Women puts the onus on women to prove 
the violence and calls on them to seek rec-
onciliation rather than resolution through 
the legal system. In recent years, Turkey 
has experienced a surge in the murder of 
women, mostly “honor” killings at the 
hands of husbands or former husbands, 
which rose from 66 in 2002 to 847 in the 
first nine months of 2013.14 Erdogan has 
explained away the increase by claiming 
that more murders of women are being 
reported, not that more are being commit-
ted. Like Christian fundamentalists every-
where, he has likened abortion to murder. 
Referring to the killing of 34 Kurds by the 
air force at Uludere in 2011, attacked in 
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private care to terminate the pregnancy.”18 
In the opinion of a former health minister, 
Mehmet Muezzinoglu, “Is abortion a dis-
ease? No. Why should the government pay 
for it?”19 Another former health minister, 
Recep Akdag, has said that rape victims 
should give birth and the state “can look 
after the babies” if necessary.20 Other sug-
gestions include the woman’s marrying her 
rapist. AKP member Ayhan Sefer Ustun, 
speaking as chairperson of the parliamen-
tary Commission of Human Rights, said 
that abortion is worse than rape.21 
 The human tragedies behind these atti-
tudes surface in accounts of a woman who 
killed herself because she was denied abor-
tion in a state hospital and a 15-year-old 
rape victim who was also prevented from 
terminating her pregnancy. The mayor 
of Ankara, Melih Gokcek, said the fetus 
was not to blame for the pregnancy and 
that mothers seeking abortion should kill 
themselves instead — taking the fetus with 
them, of course.22 Restrictions on the right 
of women to choose have now extended to 
this admonition by Deputy Prime Minister 
Bulent Arinc in a speech on moral corrup-
tion: women should not laugh in public. 
The statement had women laughing in 
public more loudly than ever.
ERGENEKON AND GULEN
 In mythology, Ergenekon (“happy 
valley”) was the place where Turks rested 
when riding westward out of central Asia. 
More recently, it is the name given to an 
underground network or “parallel state” 
allegedly involved in plotting against the 
government. This is not the first time the 
phrase has been used. The original “paral-
lel state” or “deep state” (derin devlet) or 
“Mafia state,” as some have called it, is 
believed to have been an arm of the Gladio 
underground network established in West-
ern Europe after 1945 in case the Cold 
War turned hot. Over time, the Turkish 
branch metastasized into a general anti-
left movement believed to be responsible 
for provocations such as the shooting into 
crowds of demonstrators in Taksim Square 
on May Day 1977. Thirty-four people were 
killed in the melee that followed. Military 
intervention in 1980 was followed by a 
purge of leftist activists, academics and 
bureaucrats. In the 1990s, the parallel state 
targeted Kurdish journalists in the south-
east as well as journalists and academics in 
western Turkey. Bahriye Ucok, a professor 
in Ankara University’s Faculty of Theol-
ogy, was murdered with a parcel bomb; the 
journalist Ugur Mumcu with a car bomb. 
Many others fell to an assassin’s bullet or 
bomb or simply disappeared. When the 
AKP government began its crackdown on 
the parallel state, it was assumed by many 
that the perpetrators of these crimes in the 
1980s and 1990s might finally face jus-
tice. Instead, the government focused on 
conspiracies it claimed had been hatched 
within the military since it came to power. 
Most of the crimes of the ’80s and ’90s 
have never been solved.
 The central Balyoz (Sledgehammer) 
military plot in the Ergenekon trials was 
said to involve assassination and plans to 
bomb mosques. Ultimately more than 300 
senior and retired officers — up to the rank 
of commanders in the army, air force and 
navy — were prosecuted and imprisoned. 
At least some of the evidence seems to 
have been falsified: an appointment made 
on a ship in 2003 when the ship was not 
built until 2005; street names that were 
different in 2003; a document said to have 
been typed in Calibri in 2003, before the 
font was introduced; a document said to 
have been written on a day when the pur-
ported writer was sea diving.23 The release 
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same goal, the re-Islamisation of Turkish 
society. If critical mass could be achieved, 







be the logical 
next step.25 
Both men have spoken cynically of how 
to use the system to their own advantage. 
Erdogan reportedly once said that democ-
racy was like a tram: “You ride it until you 
reach your destination, then you get off.”26 
In the 1990s, Gulen was recorded giving 
this advice to his followers: 
You must move in the arteries of the 
system without anyone noticing your 
presence until you reach all the power 
centres .… Until the conditions are 
ripe they [his followers] must contin-
ue like this .… If they do something 
prematurely the world will crush our 
heads and Muslims will suffer every-
where …. You must wait until such 
time as you have taken all the state 
power …. Until that time any step 
taken would be too early, like break-
ing an egg without waiting the full 40 
days for it to hatch.27 
 When the speech was leaked in 1999, 
Gulen fled to the United States to avoid 
possible prosecution. In 2008, after the 
Bush administration dropped its objec-
tions, he was finally given a green card. 
 Gulen’s sermons are based on the 
Quran and the writings of Bediuzzaman 
Said Nursi (1877-1960). This ethnically 
Kurdish Sunni Muslim theologian, born 
in the southeastern city of Urfa, advocated 
the teaching of religion in secular schools 
of most of the officers in June 2014 seems 
to have been a byproduct of the breakup 
of the tacit Gulenist-Erdogan alliance. The 
formal reason 
for their re-






path against Gulen, government officials 
suggested that Gulenists inside the judicia-
ry had manipulated the evidence leading to 
the prosecutions. Now, thanks to the AKP 
government, those wrongfully prosecuted 
and imprisoned were being released. 
 The Gulenists are followers of Fethul-
lah Gulen, an imam who lives in a gender-
segregated compound in Pennsylvania 
and is the inspiration for an international 
network of schools and societies based on 
social peace through “dialogue.” Gulen-
friendly banks, corporations, newspapers 
and television stations provide financial 
and social support. The sweetness and light 
emanating from Pennsylvania is deceptive, 
however. Gulen is politically astute and 
not just the simple Muslim preacher —
hoca effendi (dear teacher) — beloved of 
his followers. He has spoken aggressively 
against Kurdish separatists and against 
Turks who think Turkey should be part 
of Europe, calling them freeloaders and 
parasites.24 Though Gulen charter schools 
in the United States have no option but to 
be free and open, the schools in Turkey are 
characterized by close supervision of stu-
dents, particularly through the mentoring 
of young men and women by older abis 
and ablas, big brothers and sisters.  
 There was never any joint program as 
such, but in their different ways Erdogan 
and Gulen have been working towards the 
There was never any joint program as 
such, but in their different ways Erdogan 
and Gulen have been working towards 
the same goal, the re-Islamisation of 
Turkish society.
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and secularism in religious schools. Gu-
len’s disciples are known collectively as 
the cemaat (community). Gulen rejects the 
word “movement,” asserting that “my role 
is very limited .… There is no leadership, 
no centre, no loyalty to a centre and no 
hierarchy.”28 He prefers the word hizmet 
(service) to describe his (non-) move-
ment’s activities. Surface amity between 
Erdogan and Gulen concealed suspicion 
and differences of ideological orientation. 
Erdogan’s socioreligious roots lie in the 
Naqsibandi sufi (tarikat) movement and an 
imam-hatip-school education: his political-
Islamic roots are founded in the milli görüs 
(national view) outlook of Necmettin 
Erbakan and indicate an affinity with the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
 After forming a “tacit coalition” with 
Gulen in 2002, two years later Erdogan 
was having the Gulenists watched.29 In 
2009, the public exposure of intelligence 
chief Hakan Fidan’s secret talks with the 
PKK was regarded by the government as 
the work of Gulenists.30 In 2010, Gulen 
spoke against the Mavi Marmara aid mis-
sion to Gaza, but it was not until 2013 that 
these inner tensions exploded. Swinging an 
axe at the Gulen network’s social roots, the 
government announced that all university 
entrance-exam preparatory schools (der-
shaneler) would be closed. The Gulenists, 
controlling about 30 percent of these 
schools, were the main target: the rest were 
just collateral damage. Erdogan called the 
Gulenists “leeches” and “Hashashin” (as-
sassins), a reference to the followers of the 
eleventh century Ismaili figure, Hassan i-
Sabbah, sent from the mountains of Persia 
to assassinate ministers of the Sunni Mus-
lim Abbasid state based in Baghdad, and 
even talked of seeking Gulen’s extradition. 
The phrase “parallel state” resurfaced, but 
this time in the context of the allegedly 
subversive actions of Gulenists within the 
bureaucracy. 
 Erdogan’s attacks brought on an 
extraordinary display of public anger by 
Gulen after the government began “reas-
signing” allegedly Gulenist prosecutors 
and police. Usually restrained and calm, he 
was filmed waving his arms as he cursed 
the government, indirectly if not by name: 
“Those who don’t see the thief but go after 
those trying to catch the thief, who don’t 
see the murder but try to defame others 
by accusing innocent people — let Allah 
bring fire to their houses, ruin their homes, 
break their unities ….”31 Behind the sound 
and fury, a central question remains: What 
was the real object of this exercise, the 
purging of Gulenists within the govern-
ment because they were Gulenists or the 
suppression of charges of financial cor-
ruption against government ministers and 
members of their families, with talk of the 
“parallel state” used as a smokescreen? 
THE SHOEBOX SCANDAL
 On December 17, 2013, prosecutors 
filed charges of corruption against high 
officials and the sons of two govern-
ment ministers. Police found $4.5 million 
stacked in a shoebox in the house of the 
general director of the state-owned Halk-
bank. Millions more dollars or euros were 
found in the homes of the sons of the two 
ministers. The corruption charges involve 
tender rigging, money laundering for Iran 
and deals with a Saudi businessman, Yasin 
Al Qadi. Al Qadi has been waging court 
battles in the United States and Europe to 
remove sanctions and asset freezes based 
on accusations that he is a sponsor of ter-
rorism. On his frequent trips to Istanbul, 
Al Qadi reportedly entered Turkey without 
a visa and was escorted from the airport 
by the then prime minister’s security 
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get rid of large amounts of money being 
held at five different family addresses. 
Bilal is to meet his uncle Mustafa, older 
brother Burak and brother-in-law Berat 
and they are to remove all the money 
they have in their houses. Erdogan’s wife, 
Emine, can be heard making suggestions 
in the background. The prime minister 
mentions another brother-in-law, Ziya, but 
does not know whether he has any money 
or not. “Whatever you have in your house 
you get it out, OK?” he tells Bilal. “What 
would I have, father?” Bilal replies. “Your 
money is in the safe.” Erdogan responds, 
“That’s what I am talking about.” He says 
he is sending over Bilal’s sister, Sumeyye. 
“Is Sumeyye going to tell me where to take 
it?” Bilal asks. The amount of money is so 
great that at one stage Bilal refers to the 
difficulty of shifting it because “it takes 
too much space.” He believes it might be 
better to move the money after dark. When 
he refers to specific amounts, Erdogan cau-
tions him: “Don’t speak so openly.” There 
are other references to the need to be care-
ful. In one conversation Erdogan warns 
Bilal, “Son, you’re being listened to.” 
 Bilal tells his father that Sumeyye has 
“sorted out both sides” and “emptied them 
both.” Bilal is obviously having some 
difficulty spreading the cash around. One 
contact “can only take 10 million euros.” 
Some is given to a businessman called 
Faruk Kalyonculu, who “can work it the 
same way as he did with the other money.” 
By evening there are still 30 million euros 
left over, but Bilal thinks most of it can 
be given to a businessman to whom they 
owe money; the rest can be used to buy 
real estate. In the last conversation, begin-
ning at 10:58 p.m., Bilal reports that he 
has completed his task with the exception 
of a few hundred thousand dollars and 
some Turkish lira. The amount of money 
staff. Another key figure named in the 
charges was an Iranian, Reza Zarrab, who 
is married to the Turkish pop diva Ebru 
Gundes. Erdogan defended both Zarrab 
and Al Qadi. “I know Yasin,” he has said. 
“I believe in him as I do myself. He is a 
charitable person who loves Turkey.”32 
 By the time a second round of charges 
was prepared against 41 people, includ-
ing Erdogan’s son Bilal, the government 
had begun “reassigning” prosecutors and 
police. The justice minister ordered police 
not to act on arrest warrants. The widen-
ing net threatened to pull in Erdogan as 
well, initially through allegations that he 
received two villas on the coast near Izmir 
in return for the easing of a ban on con-
struction in an environmentally protected 
area. His claim that the villas had been 
there for 35 years was belied by a Google-
map search showing they had to have been 
built after 2010.33 In a leaked conversa-
tion with Erdogan, the developer, Mustafa 
Latif Topbas, complaining of the problems 
he is having with local authorities, can be 
heard saying, “you’ll give someone the 
message, inshaallah [God willing.]”34 Four 
months after opposing the construction of 
the buildings, the governor of Izmir, Cahit 
Kirac, was transferred to Diyarbakir. His 
environmental and urban-planning direc-
tor, who reportedly refused to help Topbas 
with his application, was subsequently 
removed from his post.35
 The truth or falsity of this allegation 
was soon swamped by the startling revela-
tions coming out of the five wiretapped 
conversations Erdogan and his son alleged-
ly had on December 17, the day prosecu-
tors brought their first round of corruption 
charges.36 Not once actually using the word 
“money” but rather “it” or the “thing” 
(şey), Erdogan refers to the 18 people who 
had been charged and instructs his son to 
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that needs to be shifted is so great that 
another recently leaked conversation by 
the hacker Haramzadeler (“bastard sons”), 
in which the prime minister tells Bilal to 
hold out for more than the $10 million he 
has been offered by a businessman, reads 
almost like a minor footnote. “Don’t take 
it,” Erdogan tells his son. “Whatever he 
has promised, he should bring more. If he 
is not going to bring that, there is no need 
…. The others are bringing. Why can’t he 
bring? What do they think this business 
is? But don’t worry, they will fall into our 
laps.”37 
 These allegations sent shock waves 
across the country. They were dismissed 
by Erdogan as being a “montage,” with 
the corruption charges represented as the 
Gulen movement’s striking back through 
its supporters in the police and judiciary. 
The then prime minister retaliated force-
fully. Hundreds of prosecutors and more 
than 10,000 police were “reassigned” in 
the coming months, with the purging of 
suspected Gulenists reaching into other 
ministries. Prosecutions of those alleged to 
have been involved in illegal wiretapping 
followed. Intervention in judicial processes 
brought strong criticism from the Supreme 
Council of Judges and Prosecutors before 
it was brought under the close control of 
the executive.38 Police were given sweep-
ing new powers of arrest, detention and 
seizure of assets. 
 Other legislative measures strength-
ened the remit of the National Intelligence 
Organization (MIT) and gave the govern-
ment greater powers to intervene in the 
Internet and remove content it did not like. 
Bans on Facebook and Twitter were part of 
the campaign to suppress the public airing 
of accusations of corruption: Twitter users 
accused of insulting government officials 
faced prosecution, while 35 Gezi Park 
demonstrators were charged with trying to 
overthrow the government, the prosecutor 
demanding “aggravated life sentences.”39 
Those charged included members of the 
Besiktas football-club support group. The 
performance of some of them in court 
was droll: they argued that it was not the 
government they wanted to overthrow but 
their chief rival on the football field. 
 The suppression of dissent extended to 
the universities. A regulation passed by the 
Higher Education Council (YOK) stipu-
lates that academics at state institutions 
— therefore, state employees — would be 
subject to censure for speaking to the me-
dia on official matters without the approval 
of a higher authority. This has now been 
used against an academic who questioned, 
on valid grounds, the constitutionality of 
Erdogan’s running for president while still 
holding public office as prime minister.40 
Thousands of Turks and foreigners are 
being watched.41 At the same time, all cor-
ruption charges brought in late 2013 and 
early 2014 were eventually dropped and 
all 53 suspects cleared. In January 2015, a 
parliamentary commission of inquiry voted 
against sending four government ministers 
to the Constitutional Court to face charges 
of corruption. The vote was split along 
party lines, with the AKP chairman of the 
commission calling on the chief prosecutor 
in Istanbul to destroy the evidence con-
tained in wiretapped phone calls. 
MARAUDERS, ATHEISTS AND 
ROBOTS
 With the AKP’s majority in parliament 
solid, with the judiciary in its hands, and 
with prosecutors and police “reassigned,” 
the role of the media became more im-
portant than ever in standing against what 
many commentators saw as a continuing 
assault on the rule of law. Parts of the me-
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rate” lobby — categories that have now 
been expanded to include atheists, leftists, 
terrorists and the Gulenist “assassins.” 
The “terrorists” included a 14-year-old 
boy, Berkin Elvan, hit on the head by a 
tear-gas canister after he was sent out to 
buy a loaf of bread; he died in a coma nine 
months later. When Erdogan mentioned 
the boy’s mother at a rally, she was jeered 
by the crowd.44 When protestors wanted to 
commemorate the boy’s death, he retorted, 
“What is this? They wanted to hold a 
ceremony to commemorate Berkin Elvan. 
Will we perform a ceremony for every 
death? He died and it’s over.”45 
 Protests against legislation giving 
the government power to remove mate-
rial from the Internet were dismissed by 
Erdogan as being the work of the “porno” 
lobby. Allegations against him personally 
came from “Peeping Toms” and the “robot 
lobby” in the social media.46 The televi-
sion presenter Yigit Bulut even claimed 
that attempts were being made from afar 
to murder Erdogan by telekinesis. This 
“climber of many greasy poles” was subse-
quently appointed one of Erdogan’s senior 
advisers.47 Tension in the country has been 
reflected by brawling in the parliament. A 
judge was karate-kicked by a member of 
the ruling party during a melee in a com-
mittee room, with a brawl subsequently 
breaking out in the Chamber of Deputies 
itself. One MP had his nose smashed, 
another’s finger was broken, and a third 
was put in a headlock as he was wrestled 
to the ground. Disquiet within the ruling 
party at Erdogan’s behavior has led to 
some resignations by parliamentarians and 
rank-and-file members, but the hardcore 
remains solid. 
 In May 2014, more than 300 miners 
died, most from carbon monoxide poison-
ing, when an explosion triggered a fire in 
dia are taking the fight to the government, 
but other outlets have been intimidated. 
Even before the corruption scandal broke, 
the jailing of journalists and publishers had 
given Turkey one of the worst reputations 
in the world for assaults on freedom of 
the press. The sacking of journalists under 
pressure from behind the scenes and Erdo-
gan’s encouragement of friendly business-
men to raise funds for the purchase of the 
Sabah/ATV conglomerate — now slavishly 
pro-government — are all playing out in 
the media. Influential organs of both print 
and broadcast have been shying away from 
telling the people exactly what is involved. 
 The Gezi protests were poorly covered 
by the mainstream media; at the height 
of police brutality, CNN Turk ran a docu-
mentary on penguins.42 When the CHP 
(People’s Republican Party) leader, Kemal 
Kilicdaroglu, addressed parliament in 
February 2014 on the subject of the tapes 
of the December 17 conversations, CNN 
Turk, NTV, Haberturk and the parliamen-
tary television station all cut the broadcast. 
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) has 
called the Turkish government an “enemy 
of the Internet,” a judgment justified by its 
banning of thousands of web sites, by Er-
dogan’s personal view that he is “ increas-
ingly against the Internet every day” and 
by the announcement in which the govern-
ment gave itself the authority to intervene 
in the Internet without a court order “to 
protect national security [and] public order 
and to prevent crime.”43 
 Erdogan’s abuse of his critics since 
Gezi Park has been nothing if not inclu-
sive. In his view, the protests were the 
work of looters, banks, Turkish holding 
companies (one of which, Koc, owns the 
Divan hotel, in whose lobby tear-gassed 
demonstrators sought refuge), foreigners, 
marauders (capulcular) and the “interest-
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of a dominant role inside the collective 
of governments assembled to bring down 
Bashar al-Assad in Damascus. The armed 
groups they have sponsored have produced 
shattering consequences for Syria and 
increasingly disastrous ones for Turkey as 
well. Out of these motley groups has arisen 
the Islamic State. By October 2014, taking 
advantage of the chaos created through 
intervention in Iraq and Syria, it had over-
run much of western Iraq as well as swaths 
of territory in northeastern Syria before its 
momentum was blocked by the Kurds at 
Kobane (Ayn al Arab). 
 The fallout from a backfiring Syria 
policy included the negative effects on 
Turkey’s relations with Russia, Iran and 
Iraq. Others have also been offended: 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, be-
cause of Erdogan’s outspoken support for 
the Muslim Brotherhood and, in Egypt’s 
case, continuing criticism of the Sisi 
government; European governments and 
the United States because of the brutality 
of the Gezi Park crackdown and continu-
ing harassment of the media; and Israel 
because of Erdogan’s open hostility going 
back many years. Even the United States 
has been looking askance at the statements 
coming out of the Turkish government. 
Turkey is too important to be ignored, 
but has rarely seemed so friendless in the 
world. 
 Erdogan’s talent for abrasive exchang-
es first came to global attention during 
a televised debate with Israeli President 
Shimon Peres at Davos in 2009. The mod-
erator allowed Peres to speak at length but 
tried to cut Erdogan off after a few min-
utes. Erdogan kept speaking, and when the 
moderator persisted he got up and walked 
out, vowing never to return and snapping 
at Peres that “when it comes to killing you 
know how to kill.” The outburst turned 
a mine near the western Anatolian town of 
Soma. Erdogan responded to the disaster 
by remarking that death was an “occu-
pational hazard” of mining, a statement 
reminiscent of an earlier observation after 
another mine disaster: “Dying is the fate 
of the miner.”48 Visiting the town, he was 
hemmed in by demonstrators and ushered 
into a small supermarket for safety. Angry 
at the booing, he was caught on camera 
hitting a man whom his bodyguards then 
beat up. Showing his bruises on televi-
sion, the man said Erdogan had called him 
“Israeli sperm,” not an expression he was 
likely to have made up.49 Earlier, a man 
who had lost family in the disaster had 
been wrestled to the ground by paramili-
tary jandarma after kicking the side of an 
official car. One of Erdogan’s senior advis-
ers ran up and kicked him solidly several 
times; he neither resigned nor was sacked 
but was allowed to take time off to recover 
from soft-tissue damage to his leg.50 Not 
even video evidence of the leader and one 
of his advisers assaulting the citizenry 
seems have to have dented Erdogan’s 
support base. When Der Spiegel ran an 
article on Soma quoting the bitter remark 
of a miner, “Go to hell Erdogan,” its 
Turkish-German reporter was bombarded 
with 10,000 Twitter, Facebook and email 
messages threatening to kill him — one 
specifically by cutting his throat. He had 
to be withdrawn from the country for his 
own safety.51 
THE SYRIA IMBROGLIO
 Turkey’s foreign policies have been re-
shaped along with everything else. Acces-
sion to the EU has been pushed so far onto 
the back burner as to be stone cold (though 
as much the fault of the EU as Turkey). 
In 2011, an effective “zero problems with 
neighbors” approach was dumped in favor 
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been calling “brother,” was sprayed with 
abuse: he was a coward; he drank the 
blood of his own people; he would soon 
be gone; and his end would be the same as 
that of Qadhafi or Milosevic.54 
 Positioning Turkey in the front rank of 
the U.S.-led “Friends of the Syrian Peo-
ple,” the government turned the southeast 
into a mobilization zone for the so-called 
Free Syrian 
Army (FSA) 








However, nothing Erdogan and Davutoglu 
said proved to be correct, and nothing they 
supported on the ground in the name of 
bringing down the government in Damas-
cus has worked. In the meantime, more 
than 200,000 Syrians have died, millions 
have fled into surrounding countries (in-
cluding about 1.5 million into Turkey) or 
have been displaced within the borders of 
their own country, and enormous damage 
has been done to civilian and state infra-
structure. Assad is still in power, and the 
FSA and the exile council have turned out 
to be irrelevant except as propaganda tools. 
The “moderate rebels” are widely regarded 
as a fiction55: in a recent speech, U.S. Vice 
President Joe Biden came close to admit-
ting as much.56 Most of the “refugee” 
camps are located close to Turkey’s border 
with Syria. Officially the refugees are clas-
sified as “guests,” a device that deprives 
them of refugee status under the aegis of 
the UNCHR. The camps have served as 
rest and recreation for Syrian “rebels” 
crossing the border to fight with the armed 
him into an instant (if temporary) hero 
across the Middle East, feeding Erdogan’s 
apparent view of himself as a neo-Ottoman 
Islamic redeemer. In 2010, when Israeli 
commandos attacked the Gaza-bound Mavi 
Marmara aid ship, killing nine Turks, he 
called Israel a terrorist and criminal state. 
 In 2011, it was Bashar al Assad’s turn. 










the time but 
now prime minister, that a new Middle 
East was taking shape and that they had 
to position themselves on the “right side 
of history.”52 Warning at first that armed 
outside intervention in Libya or anywhere 
else in the region would be a disaster, 
Erdogan ended up giving logistical sup-
port to the NATO air war. It ended with 
the killing of thousands of people and the 
murder of Muammar Qadhafi outside Sirte 
seven months later. 
 The United States and its allies then 
turned their attention to Syria, and Erdogan 
and Davutoglu turned Turkey into a pivotal 
player in the campaign to bring down the 
government in Damascus. They claimed to 
have done their best to persuade Assad to 
introduce reforms before dumping him. In 
fact, according to Syrian Foreign Minister 
Walid Muallim, what they wanted was 
for the Muslim Brotherhood — banned 
since 1963 and having fomented the Hama 
uprising of 1982 — to be brought into the 
political process.53 Assad, whom only a 
few months previously the two men had 
Most of the “refugee” camps are located 
close to Turkey’s border with Syria. 
Officially the refugees are classified as 
“guests,” a device that deprives them 
of refugee status under the aegis of the 
UNCHR.
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this point in the autumn of 2014, referring 
to the Suleyman Shah tomb just across the 
border as a specific site that might need 
protecting. Extraterritorial rights to guard 
this tomb of the grandfather of the first 
Ottoman sultan were given to Turkey by 
the French mandatory government of Syria 
under a treaty signed in 1921. Among the 
conversations leaked to the media early in 
2014 was one in which the then Turkish 
foreign minister, a senior foreign ministry 
official, a senior military officer and the 
head of MIT discussed launching a false-
flag attack on this supposedly sacrosanct 
site to justify intervention. “I’ll make up a 
cause of war by ordering a missile attack 
on Turkey,” the MIT head can be heard 
saying. “We can also prepare an attack on 
Suleyman Shah tomb if necessary.” He 
also referred to 2,000 trucks that had been 
sent from Turkey into Syria, their contents 
not specified.60 
 Following the rise of the Islamic State, 
the United States and other governments 
began calling on Turkey to seal its borders, 
as if they themselves were not also respon-
sible for the unleashing of takfiri savagery 
on Iraq and Syria. The ambivalence of the 
Turkish response to pressure to join the 
anti-IS coalition (“of the clueless,” ac-
cording to Sharmine Narwani 61) could be 
justified after the June 2014 seizure by IS 
militants of 49 Turkish diplomats and their 
dependents in Mosul. However, even after 
they were released four months later (ap-
parently traded for 180 IS takfiris held by 
rival armed groups), the ambiguity contin-
ued. As IS forces closed in on Kobane in 
October, Saleh Muslim, the leader of the 
Democratic Union Party (PYD), traveled 
from Kobane to Ankara to seek military 
support from the Turkish government. He 
was told he would have it if he aligned the 
Syrian Kurds with the so-called Free Syr-
groups before returning to the relative 
comfort of tents, blankets, food and heat-
ing provided by local and international aid 
agencies. The Apaydin camp has served as 
a base for the senior figures in the FSA. 
 Over the past four years, thousands of 
foreign takfiris (radical jihadis) from more 
than 80 countries have traveled to Syria, 
swelling the epicenter of global jihad. 
Most have flown to Istanbul before making 
their way to “safe houses” in the southeast: 
those coming from the Caucasus are able 
to cross the Georgian border along the 
eastern Black Sea coast. By late 2014, the 
Turkish government was insisting that it 
was doing its best to stem the flow, while 
preparing to train “moderates” to join the 
fighting. Cross-border activity from Tur-
key has included the attack on the Syrian 
Armenian town of Kassab in March 2014 
by an assortment of jihadists, including 
Chechens. The flight of the townspeople 
and the desecration of their churches fol-
lowed. During the assault, a Syrian jet 
attacking armed groups around the town 
was shot down after allegedly crossing 
into Turkish air space, a claim denied 
by the pilot, who ejected safely several 
kilometers inside the Syrian border.57 Arms 
have flowed into Syria through Turkey 
and across other borders. By early 2013, 
Jordanian, Saudi and Qatari military cargo 
planes were reported to have flown more 
than 160 shipments of weapons, includ-
ing one large consignment from Croatia, 
directly to Ankara’s Esenboga airport or 
other airports in Turkey or Jordan.58 Other 
shipments came from Libya, which also 
supplied large numbers of fighting men 
following the destruction of the govern-
ment in Tripoli.59
 Having called in 2012 for a buf-
fer zone to be created across the Syrian 
border, the Turkish government returned to 
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such zones, and even the United States 
is not in favor. In Europe, only a French 
president whose public support is lower 
than Nicolas Sarkozy’s likes the idea. 
 The Turkish republic is roiled by ex-
istential conflict: between the government 
and the PKK; between nationalist Turks 
and nationalist Kurds; between Ataturk’s 
secular republic and Erdogan’s increas-
ingly religious one; between Erdogan and 
the Pennsylvania cleric; between Erdogan 
and Turks who have demonstrated peace-
fully in the streets, only to be mistreated 
by police. The military remains part of 
the equation. The decimation of its senior 
ranks and humiliation at the hands of 
Erdogan created a backlash of resignations 
and refusals of promotion by their junior 
officers out of loyalty to their superiors, 
but army commanders have ruled out 
another bout of intervention, and most 
commentators agree on its improbability. 
Economics will continue to tip the balance 
one way or another. Erdogan looks after 
his constituents, but the currency is losing 
value, inflation is up, growth is down, 
and predictions are grim.62 Religion is a 
great pacifier, and there are limits to what 
people will accept in return for the prom-
ise of eternal redemption, but Erdogan is 
a seasoned political campaigner and well 
placed to lead the AKP to another victory 
when general elections are held in June. 
 The government might be “neo-Otto-
man” in ambition, but its domestic power 
is the product of tools made available to 
it by modernity. Indeed, there is no prec-
edent in Ottoman history for the system-
atic way in which the AKP government 
has managed to re-engineer society, with 
near-majority electoral support. Consen-
sual authoritarianism might best define the 
relationship. Erdogan’s creeping counter-
revolution has already destroyed much of 
ian Army. Refusing, he returned to Ko-
bane and the onslaught on the town by the 
Islamic State. While negotiating through 
intermediaries with the imprisoned head 
of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), 
Abdullah Ocalan, Erdogan has taken a 
harsh line against the Syrian Kurds because 
of the close PKK-PYG relationship and the 
spectre of an expanded Kurdish state. The 
past few years have been dominated by talk 
of a “Kurdish peace” inside Turkey, but 
Erdogan wants to negotiate from a position 
of strength, and that means controlling the 
Kurds on both sides of the Turkish-Syrian 
border. The stout defence of Kobane by the 
Kurds, with the backing of U.S. air strikes, 
has set this strategy at odds. 
THE WASP’S NEST
 In taking a front-row position in the 
attack on Syria, Erdogan has emptied 
a wasp’s nest on his own country. He 
responded to Gezi Park by blaming others, 
and this is how he has responded to the 
crisis in Syria: Assad remains the root of 
all evil, not the Islamic State, not the other 
armed gangs that have laid waste to the 
country, and not the governments backing 
them with money, weapons and territory 
for mobilization and training. Despite all 
the evidence that their Syria policy has run 
into a dead end, Erdogan and Davutoglu 
insist they were right and that Syria would 
not be where it is now if only people had 
listened to them. They continue to argue 
that no campaign against the Islamic State 
can succeed unless the Syrian government 
is also brought down. In late 2014, Davu-
toglu revived Turkey’s proposal for buffer/
no-fly zones to be established across the 
border. This is unlikely to go any further. 
Russia and China can be counted on to 
block any new attempt to win UN Security 
Council support for the establishment of 
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sive and reactionary. The ghost of 1909 is 
hovering somewhere in the Turkish home. 
Erdogan has earned a place in history, even 
if only history can decide what that place 
will be. 
“old Turkey.” Some of it needed destroy-
ing (the stranglehold of the military), but 
in its interventionist 63 authoritarianism, 
the “new Turkey” duplicates the old while 
replacing a progressive vision of society 
with one that many Turks regard as regres-
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